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FACEBOOK: AN EMERGING ARENA FOR POLITICS OF SELF-




The present article aims to expand scholarship on the political role of social media by focusing 
on the case of Facebook and the self-determination claims of Turkish Cypriots vis-à-vis Turkey. 
Drawing upon a virtual ethnography of relevant Facebook sites and groups, this article 
scrutinises whether social media offer an innovative public platform for the politics of self-
determination or on-line claims are in reality formed and negotiated in the same manner as the 
offline ones. The article concludes that Turkish Cypriots’ Facebook activism may very well be 
for strengthening their community, shielding their distinct characteristics from mainland Turkey 
and raising their self-esteem, rather than indicating demands for complete autonomy in the 
traditional political sense of the word and/or statehood.  
 





Social media platforms have indisputably (trans-)formed the nature of private and public 
communication (Dijk, 2013, p.7). They have also enabled spaces for new dynamic of social and 
political power for non-mainstream text producers against the discourses of established 
institutions (Kelsey and Benett 2014 cited in Khosravinik and Zia, 2014, p. 757). Mobilisation 
hence has become more horizontal and structured around shared interests and concerns in 
contrast to the top-down model in mainstream mass communication (Eickelman and Anderson, 
2003). Facebook for instance together with twitter with respect to their symbolic and virtual 
constructions have emerged in the last decade as innovative communication tools for political 
claims. However, it is debatable whether the social media possess an enabling power in their 
own right to generate genuine political activism. 
 The recent self-determination claims emanating from within the Turkish Cypriot 
community against Turkey’s hegemony on the de facto Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus 
(‘TRNC’) through facebook constitute in this sense an intriguing phenomenon. This is mainly 
because traditionally, Turkish Cypriots have regarded Turkey as a motherland, to which they 
have also been grateful for creating a safe territory they much longed for, especially since the 
1950s, when inter-communal fighting started on the island. The longing for the arrival of Turkish 
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troops was even often expressed in stories, poetry and songs, “as a longing for the lover who 
would come to rescue his suffering bride” (Byrant, 2008, p. 415). 
Since the late 1990s, however, a significant number of middle-class, especially young, 
Turkish Cypriots have started to re-articulate concerns about the Turkish hegemony on the island 
and to emphasize Kıbrıslılık (Cypriotness) as their ‘genuine’ identity (Hatay and Bryant, 2008; 
Akcali, 2011). They have also supported a rapprochement with the Greek Cypriots in the form of 
a federal structure in Cyprus and European Union membership – the latter materialised in 2004. 
The 1990s also coincided with the mass arrival of Turkish working class immigrants from the 
mainland – an arrival made possible by ‘TRNC’ policy of not imposing any passport control for 
those coming from Turkey. Well-educated and well-off Turkish Cypriots even started to make 
claims during this period about their culturally and even ethnically difference from the Turks, 
emphasising an affinity with white Europeans based on claims of lineage with Venetians and 
Lusignans (a French dynasty), who ruled the island before the Ottoman conquest in 1571. 
However, as Hatay and Bryant (2008, p. 431) aptly observe, these Turkish Cypriot claims can be 
considered quite deceptive, for Kıbrıslılık does not necessarily imply a common identity for the 
entire island, but the resurgence of Turkish Cypriot demands for self-determination versus 
Turkey’s domination, in order to accentuate their distinct insular identity. In particular, social 
media, especially Facebook, the platform most used by Turkish Cypriots (HaberKibris, 2017), 
have become a significant medium through which Turkish Cypriots have started disseminating 
such claims and re-enact a uniquely Cypriot memory and identity.  
The aim of the present paper hence is to analyse this phenomenon and understand 
whether such virtual practices bring a novelty to the ways in which a rather complex and 
ambivalent case of self-determination claim is negotiated. To achieve this purpose, I will first 
conceptually discuss the impact of social media on the formation of collective political claims 
and activism. I will then examine the complex dynamics of Turkish Cypriot identity’s 
(trans)formation since the island’s partitioning in 1974, and the ensuing self-determination 
claims. Next, I will demonstrate the ways in which Facebook serves as the virtual platform of 
Turkish Cypriots’ current political aspirations and performances. This will be done thanks to a 
virtual (online) ethnography which extends the ethnographic scrutiny and methods to settings 
where interactions between people are digitally mediated rather than face-to-face. Three time 
periods will be analysed: 2009, the rather nascent years of Facebook; 2013, a period when 
3 
 
Turkey experiences the consolidation of the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) hegemony 
and emerges as a regional trade power in times when Greece and the Republic of Cyprus found 
themselves in financial crises; and 2018, a period which marks the consolidation of the 
authoritarian turn in Turkey. Finally, drawing upon my empirical data, I will offer an in-depth 
analysis on whether social media in general, and Facebook, in particular, as a symbolic and 
virtual construction creates an innovative public platform for politics of self-determination.  
SOCIAL MEDIA: WHAT IMPACT DOES IT HAVE ON THE FORMATION OF 
COLLECTIVE POLITICAL CLAIMS AND ACTIVISM?  
 According to Boyd (2008, p. 112), technologies such as the social media are shaped by 
the society itself and “reflect society’s values back at us, albeit a bit refracted”. For Nalbantoglu 
(2014, p. 11), digital activism is more likely to be successful if it occurs both online and offline. 
In their scrutiny on the social media and the events of the Arab Spring, Wolfsfeld et al. (2013) 
argue that one cannot understand the role of social media in collective action without first taking 
into account the political environment in which they operate. They also suggest that a significant 
increase in the use of the new media is much more likely to follow a significant amount of 
protest activity than to precede it. At the same time however, internet is claimed to have 
“changed the traditional conditions of identity production” (Zhao et al. 2008, p. 1817). The 
anonymous online environment and, more correctly, ‘role-playing’ enable individuals to reinvent 
themselves through the production of new identities and as such internet becomes an 
empowering process both for individuals and collectivities (Zhao et al. 2008, p. 1818). This does 
not necessarily mean that Facebook identities are fake. On the contrary, they have real 
consequences on the lives of the individuals who construct them (Zhao et al. 2008, p. 1831-
1832).             
 It is also argued that social network sites make the transition from imaginary to action, 
where people pass from a representational space to a relational and performative one (Mazali 
2011, p. 290). For instance, based on her fieldwork which includes interviews with the Chinese 
diaspora in the United States, Shi (2005, p. 67-68) suggests that active and strategic use of social 
media for identity negotiation generates an agency of empowerment within a collectivity; 
although, she also acknowledges that shared cultural identity and mediated communications 
alone cannot fulfil the task of generating activism. The social media provide nevertheless 
socialising topics and contexts and create a sense of cultural coherence and unity for the Chinese 
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diaspora, by symbolically reviving the memories of the past and retelling a certain history, which 
anchors the identification of the floating diasporic lives (Shi 2005, p. 69). This is important for 
the sake of social capital, since if this were to decline, a community would experience increased 
social disorder, reduced participation in civic activities, and potentially more distrust among 
community members (Ellison et al. 2012, p. 1054).       
 Greater social capital hence increases inter-personal commitment within a community 
and the ability to mobilise collective actions while allowing individuals to draw on resources 
from other members of the networks to which he or she belongs (Ellison et al. 2012, p. 1054). 
Within this context, social media communication might serve to activate and/or reactivate such 
networks based on offline-based online relationships, known as ‘anchored’ hence ‘nonymous’, 
the opposite of ‘anonymous’ relationships (Zhao, 2006). Öze (2017, p. 620) argues that in the 
nonymous online environment, people do not feel free to establish their identity and real views as 
they want. This is the case, she suggests of close-knit communities like ‘TRNC’, where people 
live closer to each other and have frequent face-to-face contacts. Turkish Cypriots who have easy 
access to technological tools and the internet hence feel under social pressure in social media and 
their ‘anchored relationships’ pressurise them not to reveal their genuine opinions on social 
media (Öze, 2016, p. 961). In this case, internet and social media seem to be integrated into the 
regular patterns of social communication and interaction (Wellman et al. 2002; Kelly 2007).  
 Foot and Schneider (2006) have already emphasised that social movements are at the 
same time ‘sociotechnical networks’, composed of both human and technological or material 
components (2006: 12). This resonates with what Bruno Latour (1992) identified as the ‘missing 
masses’, the material and technological artefacts that go unnoticed in the scrutiny of human 
practices. The ‘missing masses’ need to be considered when we try to categorise social 
interactions into ‘real’ (offline) and ‘virtual’ (online) interactions (Kelley, 2007, p. 10). As 
Wellman et al. (2002, p. 11) aptly observe for instance, “rather than operating at the expense of 
the ‘real’ face-to-face world, internet may very well be “an extension, with people using all 
means of communication to connect with friends and relatives”. Moreover, the internet is not a 
non-hierarchical space, but is embedded in structural inequalities of the ‘real’ world and the 
strong privileges of some (existing) media over others (Aouragh, 2012, p. 524). Hence, there are 
always more advantaged discourses and narratives in the social media, selected, maintained and 
promoted by more advantaged political and social groups. Cottle and Nolan (2007, p. 657) have 
5 
 
proposed to situate the new/social media practices for instance in relation to the contextual 
structures of “state power, the role of the military and also the organisation of political 
opposition in and across the different societies concerned”. According to Cottle (2011, p. 650), 
this would do more justice to both the political and media complexities that operate in the 
background of Facebook-generated activism and mobilisation, as ‘real event’ enable ‘real 
actions’ 
It is important to note, though, that the constitution of cyber political claims is reinforced 
by the offline ones as underscored by Wellmann et al. (2002). It is hence essential to avoid the 
trap that “technological change causes or determines social change” (Wyatt, 2008, p. 168) and in 
order to do this, it is essential to scrutinise “technology within its social and political contexts” 
(Davidson, 2013, p. 3). In the light of such conceptual discussion about the impact of social 
media on political activism, in the following section I shall therefore examine the complex 
dynamics of Turkish Cypriot identity (trans-)formations since the island’s partitioning in 1974 
and the formation of their current self-determination claims. The ways in which such claims are 
formed and negotiated offer an interesting case study for the literature on whether the social 
media possess an enabling power in their own right to generate genuine political activism, 
especially within the context of a de-facto state. After-all, as Caspersen (2009, p.59 cited in 
Kanol, 2017, p. 66) underlines, “de-facto states have an agenda of their own which is often 
contrary to that of the external supporters and the relationship is often fraught with tensions”. 
Building on this insight, I will then demonstrate the ways in which Facebook has been serving as 
the virtual platform for Turkish Cypriots’ current political aspirations. 
 (TRANS-)FORMING IDENTITIES IN NORTHERN CYPRUS  
The ethno-territorial conflict which dates back to the decolonization period from the British 
Empire in the 1950s led to the territorial partitioning of the island in 1974. The Turkish Cypriot 
leadership declared a de facto Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (‘TRNC’) in 1983, on the 
territory carved out of an internationally recognised Republic of Cyprus (RoC), administered by 
Greek Cypriots since 1963. Following the 1974 territorial partitioning of the island by the help of 
the Turkish military and the flight and expulsion of the Greek Cypriots from the northern part of 
the island, Turkish Cypriots began to construct their much desired imagined state on the newly 
acquired territory under Turkey’s hegemony (Ker-Lindsay, 2011).  
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Since they also desired to consolidate their gains and move forward with the new state’s 
economy, they overall did not oppose the agreement between Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriot 
administration to facilitate the immigration of several thousand people from rural Turkey (Hatay, 
2007). What can be described as an initial honeymoon was however followed by negative 
reactions among the Turkish Cypriots toward the influx of this large number of Turkish settlers 
(Hatay, 2008). Although this intervention was strongly aspired and celebrated by the Turkish 
Cypriot community at the time, the romanticism and longing for Turkey have in time left place 
to resentment which has in time pushed especially left-wing Turkish Cypriots to envision a 
unified and independent Cyprus together with the Greek Cypriots. However, such narrative was 
marginalised within the Turkish Cypriot community up until the mid 1990s, since it could not 
compete with the Turcophile feelings, which rose especially during the ‘enclave period’ (1963-
1974), when Turkish Cypriots lived in self-protected enclaves. 
 The Turkish Cypriot de-facto state however has never been recognised by the 
international community which supports the RoC’s claim of full sovereignty all over the island 
and regards ‘TRNC’ as a territory under occupation. However, the RoC has not exercised any 
authority in the northern part of the island since 1974, mainly due to Turkey’s military presence 
in this entity. Turkey is the only state in the world which recognizes the ‘TRNC’ and which does 
not recognize the RoC. It also keeps its air space and ports closed to Greek Cypriot planes and 
vessels. On the other hand, the ‘TRNC’ is embargoed by the international community (Ker-
Lindsay, 2011). Turkey acts hence as the military and economic patron of northern Cyprus. The 
Turkish army controls not only the Turkish Cypriot military, but also the Turkish Cypriot police 
(Akcali, 2009). In return for the economic and military aid it receives, the ‘TRNC’ has almost 
always followed Ankara’s orders regarding the latter’s interests, even when ‘TNRC’’s optimal 
choice was not consistent with Turkey’s (Bahceli, 2004 cited in Kanol, 2015, p. 69). As a result, 
as Kanol and Köprülü (2017) have demonstrated, reliance on a patron state has led to dynamics 
of tutelage in northern Cyprus, hindering the quality of its democracy.  
Despite decades of negotiations and a normalisation of intercommunity relations, 
discrepancies exist between Turkish and Greek Cypriot aspirations about a solution acceptable 
for all.  This fact is essential to understand the present Turkish Cypriot political claims, since 
during the Europeanisation process, “a deep-rooted social transformation took place within the 
Turkish-Cypriot community” (Sonan 2007, p. 3). As Vural and Rüstemli (2006, p. 344) note, it 
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was the time when “the historical notion of ‘Turkish community of Cyprus’ […] started not 
corresponding to a uniform collective identity”. Turkish Cypriots organized mass demonstrations 
against the nationalistic Turkish Cypriot leadership, who opposed EU membership. Such 
mobilisation was boosted by the election victory of the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) 
in Turkey in November 2002, under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who was pro-
European at the time. In order to facilitate Turkey’s entry in the EU, Erdoğan changed the 
traditional Turkish foreign policy on Cyprus and gave full support to the pro-solution political 
opposition in ‘TRNC’ and the comprehensive peace plan for the resolution of the Cyprus issue, 
which was released by the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in 2003, just after AKP’s electoral 
victory (Loizides and Keskiner, 2004).  
The ‘TRNC’ hardliner leadership hence felt obliged in April 2003 to open crossing points on 
the cease-fire line that since 1974 has divided the two communities in Cyprus. This opening 
favored the pacific contacts between Greek and Turkish Cypriots and increased the reunification 
demands of the latter group. Many Turkish Cypriots saw in the reunification an end to their long 
years of international isolation. They also started to apply for the RoC citizenship, since, despite 
the partition, they would still have the right to be individual citizens of the RoC and, after the EU 
accession, of EUrope itself. They also started to use the RoC state institution facilities, such as 
the public health services. Furthermore, a majority of Turkish Cypriots (64%) supported the UN 
reunification plan – the so-called Annan Plan – that was put into referendum on 24 April 2004 
and which was voted down by a strong 76% majority of Greek Cypriots. As a result, the RoC 
entered the EU alone in May 2004, without the Turkish Cypriots. Since then, the Turkish Cypriot 
community has started feeling resentful against both the international and Greek Cypriot 
communities and started voting for the nationalist politicians once again (Akçalı, 2011). The left-
wing intellectuals, politicians and youth have continued to resent Turkey’s cultural, militaristic 
and politico-economic hegemony on the island and maintained their aspirations towards a future 
based on Kıbrıslılık (Cypriotness)  (Akçalı, 2009, 2011).   
The presence of Turkish settlers on the island since 1974 and a growing number of 
Turkish migrant workers especially since the 1990s have further exacerbated local hostile 
feelings towards Turkey. The mainland Turks’ “religiosity, appearance, language – including 
spoken Turkish or other languages – and other cultural differences” have become “strong 
boundary-maintaining mechanisms” for Turkish Cypriots (Hatay, 2008, p. 151). It has in fact 
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been argued that the contact with rural Turks from Turkey has made Turkish Cypriots, perhaps 
for the first time, aware of their Cypriotness (Güven-Lisaniler and Rodriguez, 2002, p. 184). 
Interestingly, in most domains of social, political and economic life in northern Cyprus, Turkish 
settlers do not share the same privileges as Turkish Cypriots do, such as access to civil servants 
jobs in most departments of the TC administration (Navarro-Yashin 2006, p. 92). Due to the 
perceived colonization of the island by Turkey and a “fear of political subordination” (Navarro-
Yashin, 2006, p. 92), many Turkish Cypriots, particularly those belonging to the middle-class, 
have started lamenting the presence of settlers and especially poor Turkish workers. 1 They claim 
that their ‘Cypriot’ culture is in danger. This grievance is also extended to both the Turkish 
soldiers, whose number is about 30,000, and about 55000 Turkish students.2 Since the mid 
1990s, discourses such as ‘Cyprus is under occupation’ and ‘All problems of Cyprus started with 
the intervention of foreign powers, notably Turkey’, once voiced only by a majority of Greek 
Cypriots, Greeks and the Turkish Cypriot marginalised left-wing, have now also become 
common discourses among ordinary Turkish Cypriots. A considerable number of Turkish 
Cypriots lament that “they have been invaded and culturally and physically annihilated” (Yashin-
Navarro, 2006, p. 94). It is exactly on these grievances and claims for self-determination as 
articulated on social media that this article now turns to. 
“TURKISH CYPRIOTS ARE BECOMING EXTINCT” 
 Drawing on my virtual ethnographic work, this section explores the mediated interactions 
among Turkish Cypriots on the question of self-determination. Virtual ethnography is an 
adaptive ethnography which sets out to suit itself to the context within which it is enmeshed 
(Hine, 2000, p. 65). Data presented here refers to three rounds of virtual ethnography. The first 
was conducted between May and December 2009, following the disillusion of the Turkish 
Cypriots with the European Union and the new electoral success of the nationalistic parties in 
‘TRNC’. It focused on four Facebook pages created on issues of the uniqueness of Cypriot 
culture and the shrinking and disappearing of the Turkish Cypriot population. A purposive 
sampling strategy was chosen so to maximise the collection of data which could speak directly to 
the aim of this study, i.e. how demands of self-determination are formed and negotiated on the 
web. The second round was conducted between January and May 2013, at a period of deep 
economic crisis both in Greece and RoC, which also saw Turkey rising as an emerging economic 
and regional power. During this period, I traced more a-political Turkish Cypriot Facebook sites 
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with a large number of followers. These sites put emphasis not on self-determination claims, but 
on the uniqueness of the Turkish Cypriot culture such as Kıbrıs Türkçesi (Turkish Cypriot 
Language), Kıbrıslı Lafcıklar ve Kıbrıs Kültürümüz (Cypriot dialect and our Cypriot Culture) 
and Gıbrıslı Olunmaz, Gıbrıslı Doğulur (One cannot become a Cypriot, one is born as a 
Cypriot).             
 Finally, the third online ethnography was conducted between January and April 2018, in 
the midst of rising authoritarianism in Turkey and economic turmoil in ‘TRNC’.  In this period, 
facebook sites expressed more nostalgia for the past than self-determination claims. In all 
rounds, I participated to the online discussions with my genuine Facebook profile and name. I 
asked questions and examined images. Overall, I analysed 150 Facebook thread discussions, 
around 50 in each period, paying particular attention to recurrent themes and discursive 
formations on: Cypriot identity and self-determination claims; criticism towards Turkey, Turkish 
and Turkish Cypriot politicians; and the distinct Turkish Cypriot culture, language and cuisine. I 
documented my observations and online interactions as field notes and took screen captures of 
the various sites and discussions. Materials were then analysed in terms of both content and 
themes following a coding approach (Elo and Kyngas, 2008). 
 
May/December 2009 - Kıbrıslı Türkler’in Nesli Tükeniyor (Turkish Cypriots are Becoming 
Extinct) 
  
 The most popular and animated of such sites during the May-December 2009 period was 
named Kıbrıslı Türkler’in Nesli Tükeniyor (Turkish Cypriots are Becoming Extinct), with 3,283 
members in May 2009, but only 96 in April 2018.3 The profile photo depicted a young girl and a 
boy sitting on a rock by the seaside, hugging each other and mourning. The basic information 
section of the site contained both the Turkish and English version of a poem by the Turkish poet 
Nazim Hikmet, Bir Hazin Hürriyet (A Sad State of Freedom) which talks about being ‘free’ 
and/or ‘liberated’, but only to slave for others and to make the rich richer. The poem further 
reads “You love your country as the nearest, most precious thing to you. But one day, for 
example, they may endorse it over to America, and you, too with your great freedom, you have 
the freedom to become an air-base”. While some members of this site were claiming that they 
would prefer to live with the Greek Cypriots in the south rather than living with Turks in the 
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north of Cyprus, many others were making calls to fellow Turkish Cypriots to do something 
about their pitiful situation.  
The site owners and the members were also associating Turkey’s hegemony on the island 
with imperialism. This could enable them to position their resistance against Turkey within an 
anti-imperialistic and traditional leftist framework, even though most of their remarks about 
Turks living in Cyprus could easily resonate with the xenophobic far-right. This contradiction, I 
would argue, is one of the most ambivalent dimensions of the self-determination claims of 
Turkish Cypriots, which are often embraced and led by ‘leftist’ political parties in the ‘TRNC’. 
On the one hand, some Turkish Cypriots accuse the Turkish leadership and their pro-Turkey 
compatriots of being chauvinistic and regressive and identify themselves, qua pro-EU, as peace 
lovers and progressive. They also consider Greek Cypriots as their brothers and advocate a 
common life with them. On the other hand, their attitudes and discourses towards immigrant 
workers from Turkey – often with Arabic (from Hatay) and Kurdish ethnic origins – can easily 
be defined as racist and xenophobic. Various remarks in a number of posts suggested that these 
workers were ‘smelly’ and cahil (uneducated) and they ‘spoiled’ the social scenery in Cyprus. 
Gaco, meaning gypsy, a derogatory term used for Turks living in Cyprus, was also often 
employed by site members when referring to Turks. A thread on 12-13 May 2009 that generated 
475 derogatory wall posts about working class Turks living on the island further indicates the 
ambivalence of online Turkish Cypriot self-determination claims which often resonated with 
xenophobic comments.          
 The thread began with Deep Blue writing that the UBP (the National Unity party which 
campaigned against the Annan Plan and reunification with Greek Cypriots) came to power in the 
‘TRNC’ thanks to the votes of the Turkish settlers and they are therefore satilmış – bought with 
money by Turkey and therefore not real patriots.4 A thread answering this post posited that 
political claims and criticism should not lead to a division between Turkish and Turkish Cypriot 
because in so doing, the progressive actors in the society lose sight of their real objective. The 
post owner continued by arguing that Turkish Cypriots should never forget what Turkey has 
done for Turkish Cypriots and people from the mainland are coming to Cyprus because there is a 
need for workforce on the island. Fair Play responded to this post by insisting that this is still 
Turkey’s fault, because Turkish Cypriots have become second class citizens in Cyprus and this is 
unacceptable for the local population. Fair Play reminded that the ‘TRNC’’s Central Bank is run 
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by a Turk from Turkey for example, and not by a Turkish Cypriot. As reactions and resentment 
towards Turkey and condescending remarks about Turks living in Cyprus grew, this site became 
a stage of passionate debates between Turkish citizens living in Cyprus and the site members and 
owners. Interestingly, interventions by Turkish citizens in this heated debate were qualified as 
racist and chauvinistic by the site owners.   
 KKTC’de Kuran kursu istemiyoruz (We do not want Quranic courses in Cyprus: 
https://www.facebook.com/groups/111671170739/) was another prominent site with over 1,000 
members in 2009 which allowed to further explore the Turkish Cypriot demands of self-
determination. It was set up in August 2009 by young Turkish Cypriots against the initiatives of 
the conservative Turkish AKP government to open Quranic courses on the island upon the 
request of primarily mainland Turks who wanted their children to learn Quran, especially during 
summer holidays. In 2009, the ‘TRNC’ government implemented summer religious courses, 
including Quran lessons (Dayioglu and Hatay, 2016, p. 159). During this time, the AKP 
government in Turkey had already shifted from its pro-European stance and concentrated more 
on consolidating its hegemony in Turkey and consequently in northern Cyprus. However, 
Turkish Cypriots adhere generally to a strict form of secularism and they are not particularly 
influenced by organised religion (Yesilada, Noordijk, Webster, 2009; Yesilada, 2009). Families 
who want to send their children to Quranic courses have hence often reported that they had to 
face strong public criticism, particularly from local teachers (Dayioglu and Hatay, 2016, p. 159). 
In addition to public reaction, leftist opposition parties, the Cyprus Turkish Teachers’ Trade 
Union (Kıbrıs Türk Öğretmenler Sendikası-KTÖS) and many NGOs led by Alevi associations 
also opposed the opening of Quranic courses (Dayioglu and Hatay, 2016, p. 159). It is therefore 
not suprising that most of the threads on this site were almost all the time verbally offensive 
towards Turks and Turkey. This was for instance the case when a mainland Turk member wrote 
the following post: “I support the opening of Quranic courses. You, Cypriots need to give some 
importance to spirituality. You are so used to receiving everything from Turkey and practicing 
all sorts of immoral acts. Nobody says no to gambling and prostitution on the island”. Members 
who I assumed to be Turkish Cypriots by the way they wrote in Turkish using Cypriot dialect 
terms started using derogatory terms, accusing that person of being ignorant, coming from an 
underdeveloped country and various other offensive epithets.    
12 
 
Another very interesting Facebook page was called Kıbrıs’ta son mücadele (The last 
struggle in Cyprus)5. Its profile description proclaimed that the site was set up to start a youth 
movement to say no to extinction and to resist against those who have changed the 
demographical structure of Cyprus, trying to assimilate the Turkish Cypriots. The choice of the 
word mücadele (struggle) is significant, because it calls for insubordination against the 
hegemonic power of Turkey, just like most grandfathers of many of this Facebook page’s 
followers had done about fifty years before, against another hegemonic power: the Greek 
Cypriots. ‘Struggle’ also hints at  territorial self-determination and politico-economic autonomy. 
This site, however, only had a handful of members and it soon disappeared from Facebook. 
Finally, Kıbrıslı Genler Geleceğimiz icin (Turkish Cypriot genes for our future) was another 
prominent site with several hundred members and it was set up to call Turkish Cypriots to mate 
only with other Turkish Cypriots in order to continue the Turkish Cypriot breed. There were not 
lengthy discussions about this subject on the site, but it reflected the widespread tendency among 
parents in northern Cyprus who prefer their children to marry other Cypriots and stay on the 
island rather than going away.  
January/May 2013- Gıbrıslı Olunmaz, Gıbrıslı Doğulur (One cannot become a Cypriot, 
one is born as a Cypriot) 
 
If the websites surveyed in 2009 mainly focused on liberation from Turkey and further 
autonomy, four years later the Facebook scene had almost completely transformed into more 
mild platforms. Between January-May 2013, in fact, all the previous surveyed websites were no 
longer active, with the only partial exception of Kıbrıslı Türkler’in Nesli Tükeniyor. It is difficult 
to pin down the exact reason why this happened. Contextual politics obviously matters, as the 
events from 2009 till 2013, with the frustrated attempts to solve the ‘Cypriot question’ (Kyris, 
2014; Ker-Lindsay, 2011) might have convinced the Turkish Cypriots that no support from either 
the Greek Cypriots or the European Union could have helped them in their self-determination 
efforts. Second, in 2012-2013, the RoC was still feeling the dire consequences of the 2008 global 
financial crisis, which spurred anti-European sentiments amongst Greek Cypriots as well. Third, 
the political left in northern Cyprus was no longer powerful as before, and this most probably 
alleviated the anti-Turkey and anti-settler rhetoric in ‘TRNC’. Thus, during this period, I 
observed mainly a-political Turkish Cypriot sites which on Facebook attracted large number of 
followers. These Facebook sites put emphasis not on self-determination claims, but on the 
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uniqueness of the Turkish Cypriot culture. Kıbrıs Türkçesi (Turkish Cypriot Language, 
https://www.facebook.com/groups/GIBRIZ/), which had operated since 2009 with very few 
members, reached 8,173 members in 2013. Its aim is to revive and continue the Turkish Cypriot 
dialect, which is quite distinct from the Turkish spoken on the mainland. The site strongly warns 
its followers not to post anything regarding politics, as this is said to create fragmentation and 
heated arguments among the members. Kıbrıslı Lafcıklar ve Kıbrıs Kültürümüz– (Cypriot dialect 
and our Cypriot Culture, https://www.facebook.com/_KIBRISLI-LAFCIKLAR-VE-KIBRIS-
KULTURUMUZ_-110051819018688/), with 16,722 followers, and Gıbrıslı Olunmaz, Gıbrıislı 
Doğulur (One cannot become a Cypriot, one is born as a Cypriot, 
https://www.facebook.com/Kibrisli-Olunmaz-Gibrizli-Doğulur-108980365829880/), with 1,008 
members, are all similar sites, set up to revive love for the country and culture, but they strictly 
avoid any claims about self-determination and separateness from Turkey.  
Some other sites focused on emphasising a distinct Turkish Cypriot character. Some of 
these groups, which are still active, are Gerçek Kıbrıslılar (Real Cypriots) with 10,217 members, 
Has Kıbrıslılar (Original Cypriots), with 801 members, Ben Kıbrıslıyım (I’m a Cypriot), with 
729 members, and Son Kıbrıslılar (The Last Cypriots), with 174 members. Strongholds of micro-
nationalism, especially vis-à-vis the mainland Turks living on the island, these groups mainly 
share comments about folk, the local Cypriot dialect, traditions and consumption materials, such 
as food and drinks that emphasise being Turkish Cypriot. In this sense, these websites have 
moved from a hot form of nationalism, as witnessed in the previous years, to a more subtle, banal 
form of nationalism (Billig, 1995), which is no less powerful in conveying the message of a 
distinct Turkish Cypriot identity. 
April 2018- Real Cypriots and Gatriyaba 
As a participant observer, I was ‘deported’ from the Real Cypriots site in April 2018 
without any prior notice, most probably because my Facebook profile depicted my birthplace as 
Adana, a city in Turkey. For Real Cypriots, one could not be a half-Turkish Cypriot like myself 
or a naturalised Cypriot, apparently. I’ve also found out several other Facebook groups aimed at 
reviving the Turkish Cypriot cities and villages left in the Greek Cypriot side especially in the 
Paphos area, such as Poli ve Köylerinin sesi (Voice of Poli and its villagers), Ben Baflıyım (I’m 
from Paphos), Yalya Nostalji (Yialia Nostalgia), Arodezliler (Those from Arodez). These groups 
mainly shared comments about photos from the past, neighbours, relatives, and the local cuisine 
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from that area. This fairly recent Facebook activism is reminiscent of the Palestinians’ 
occupation of corners of cyberspace to retell and remind insights into the experiences of their 
own extended families, or clans and of their particular villages of origin, as scrunitised by 
Stamatopoulou-Robbins (2005). Just like in Palestine Remembered website 
(www.palestineremembered.com), rather than acting as a new terrain of struggle and creating a 
virtual homeland online, it seems that these recent Turkish Cypriot Facebook sites reflect a 
“widespread desire as much for freedom to reconnect with specific people and pasts as to attain 
some sort of self-determination” (Stamatopoulou-Robbins, 2005, p.33).  
Gatriyaba (Elder Sister Gatriye,  https://www.facebook.com/www.gatrish.net/) is perhaps 
the most popular current Facebook site, which connects claims of self-determination from 
Turkey with a celebration of the uniqueness of the Turkish Cypriot culture and language. The 
site has 32,671 followers and it takes its name from an elderly, but politically active, witty and 
strong-willed Turkish Cypriot female character, created by the anarchist Turkish Cypriot writer 
and bar owner, Mahmut Anayasa. The character Gatriyaba or shortly Gatrish is a rebel who only 
speaks in the Turkish Cypriot dialect, which Anayasa claims is about to be forgotten and 
dismissed by the dominant mainland culture, and criticises especially pro-Turkey Turkish 
Cypriot politicians, Turkey’s leaders, but also the Turkish Cypriot society itself. The creator and 
the owner of the site, Mahmut Anayasa, argues that Gatrish will continue to produce, write and 
postulate that “the king is naked”, meaning that she will continue to bring into the light the 
complexities, hypocrisies, paradoxes that exist within the Turkish Cypriot society and politics 
vis-à-vis Turkey, as well as maintain the distinctiveness of the Turkish Cypriot culture from the 
mainland. Gatrish, for instance, criticizes the Turkish Cypriot society for its pettiness and greed 
and how such conformism hinders the community from claiming complete independence from 
Turkey.            
 Next to these current Facebook sites, some other new sites have been opened since June 
2017, which aim to bring the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities together. In June 2017, the 
Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders re-opened negotiations in Switzerland, aimed once again at 
reuniting the island after more than 40 years of division, in what some activists said could be the 
last chance of a settlement. During this time, some more Facebook groups were formed in 
support of the peace process, such as United Cyprus Now, United Cyprus Republic, Cyprus 
without borders, My motherland is Cyprus, Neither Turkey nor Greece, in order to give social 
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media support to the on-going negotiations. As the peace negotiations are currently blocked, 
these new sites stay in a dormant state at the moment, to be reactivated most probably when the 
negotiations open again.  
UNDERSTANDING FACEBOOK ACTIVISM FOR SELF-DETERMINATION  
 
 In international politics, the principle of self-determination is embodied in Article I of the 
UN Charter, which states the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples should 
be respected. It is hence a democratic value that UN upholds. However, there is not a clear 
definition of what self-determination exactly means today. Who has for instance a right to self-
determination? Is it an ethnic group, an heterogenous people, a nation? Is self-determination 
about autonomy or statehood? According to the choice approach, self-determination through 
secession simply represents an extension of liberal democratic rights (Tocci, 2003, p. 72). The 
just cause theory further suggests that a right to secession exists when a particular minority has 
been treated unjustly by the state to which it currently belongs (Tocci, 2003, p. 73). In its 
independence declaration in 1983, the ‘TRNC’ assembly indicated that “the exercise of the right 
of self-determination has become an imperative for the Turkish Cypriot people” (Blay, 1987, p. 
97). Although the choice and the just cause theory approaches explain Turkish Cypriot self-
determination claims vis-à-vis the Republic of Cyprus at the time, they fall short of explaining 
the current Turkish Cypriot self-determination claims. Social identity theory, on the other hand 
observes that self-determination happens when individuals identify with a group on the basis of 
two fundamental motives: a) subjective uncertainty reduction; and b) enhancement of self-
esteem (Abrams & Hogg, 1988; Hornsey & Hogg, 2000 cited in Psaltis and Cakal, 2016). Such 
motives may in fact be the most genuine reasons why Turkish Cypriots have started exploiting 
Facebook for self-determination claims. In other words, self-determination in the Turkish 
Cypriot context may not necessarily indicate a far-reaching autonomy in the traditional political 
sense and/or statehood claims. There are other important elaborations that need to be discussed 
here.      
 As observed by Öze (2017), it is clear that Turkish Cypriots have been pressurized by 
their offline identities in their ambivalence towards self-determination from Turkey. This can 
clearly be observed during the 2009 period, when radical discourses such as extreme self-
determination claims and calling people to struggle against Turkey and/or derogatory terms 
about mainland Turks and Turkey had gradually faded away because of not finding open public 
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support at a large scale. Such strong claims seemed to be hindered by social pressure, but also by 
the strong presence of several layers of social identity among Turkish Cypriots, e.g., 
supranational, national, religious, and ethnic layers. While many of them are very much attached 
to their Cypriotness, Turkishness also remains an important factor for a significant number of 
them (Akçalı, 2011, 2009). There are strong family links between Turkish Cypriots and mainland 
Turks, especially due a high number of inter-marriages and hybrid children (Akçalı, 2007).  
 Online interactions hence do not necessarily remove people from their offline world. 
They do not most probably create new identities and fresh beginnings either. They may, on the 
contrary, be used to support the already existing relationships and help keep people in contact, 
even when life transformations move them away from each other (Ellison et al., 2012, p.1165). 
Social boundaries also affect what people share on social media in northern Cyprus as well. 
Turkish Cypriots accept invisible offline group norms, identities and bound themselves in social 
media (Öze, 2017, p. 623). As such, they might not be willing to be too open about their 
ideological and political affiliations in the social media, although I have noted above that some 
were quite open about their xenophobism. Öze’s research also reveals that Turkish Cypriots do 
not interact as individuals, but as members of their social group standings. Their offline 
relationships (anchored relationships) affect their disclosure levels on Facebook. However, one 
should say that disclosure levels of respondents on Facebook about sensitive issues are usually 
low (Öze, 2017, p. 623). Rather than sharing their views, people frequently use Facebook to 
observe others, as they are aware of the reactions that they will face after sharing posts (Öze, 
2017, p. 623). This offers some indications about why cyber claims may in reality be formed and 
negotiated in the same manner as the offline ones, although it is true that the social media 
provides a more pre-arranged and controlled public platform for these claims to be voiced.  
 It is true at the same time that there are stark differences between native Cypriots’ and 
mainland Turks’ aspirations regarding ‘TRNC’, and this needs to be underlined. Hatay and 
Charalambous (2015) have already shown that the post-Annan Turkish Cypriot generation is in 
favour of a federal solution and reconciliation more than their grandparents and Greek Cypriots. 
A similar finding also emerges in a more recent study by Özgür et al. (2017), who have surveyed 
the political attitudes of more than 300 students in northern Cyprus, as well as their identities and 
preferences for the future of the island. The results depict that the Turkish Cypriot students, 
contrary to students from Turkey and from other countries living in Cyprus, are more supportive 
17 
 
of a decentralized federative structure, are more likely to identify themselves with both Cypriot 
and Turkish Cypriot identities and are more willing to embrace a consociational approach to the 
Cyprus Question. The Turkish Cypriot students also see fewer differences between the Turkish 
and Greek Cypriot communities than students from Turkey or other countries do (Özgür et al. 
2017). These views confirm what I have observed in the analysis of the Facebook websites, 
namely that the autonomy and self-determination claims are real and burgeoning within the 
Turkish Cypriot community and they are being expressed via various channels.   
  Facebook has hence worked as one of these channels and it is interesting to observe how 
in time, it has moved from a platform where Turkish Cypriots’ self-determination claims were 
formulated in an antagonising tone to one where a sense of Cypriotness has been formulated in 
softer tones, merely aiming at celebrating its distinct culture and insular identity without creating 
a hostile environment excluding Turkish identity. As Reyhanoglu and Cengiz (2018) have 
observed, shared comments and discourses that construct being a Cypriot every time a Cypriot 
accent is used have contributed to the re-enactment of the Cypriot identity in the virtual world 
(2018). The shift from more radical Facebook groups on self-determination claims that operated 
in 2009 towards the most recent Facebook sites emphasising the cultural traits and 
distinctiveness of Turkish Cypriots indicates a specific agency and the ability of such agency to 
create a moderate ground. After-all, the social media as a discursive mechanism engages 
predominantly with people’s political and cultural claims as a form of reinforcement, and only 
the successful political discourses (in the Cypriot case, the aspirations to protect the distinct 
Turkish Cypriot characteristic) attain the constitutive force among the many other discourses that 
are continually produced. The fact that only certain discourses become successful among the 
others may also be because the social media provides a less passionate, pre-arranged and 
controlled public sphere for socio-political claims. The new and rather ‘moderate’ discourse that 
has emerged in the Turkish Cypriot case via Facebook may very well be a form of self-
determination as well, a self-determination claim which fits better into the current Turkish 
Cypriot reality.  
CONCLUSION 
This article has tried to shed light on the emergence and the dissemination of Turkish 
Cypriots’ self-determination claims on Facebook and their re-enaction in terms of a uniquely 
Cypriot memory and identity. It aimed to scrutinise this burgeoning phenomenon and to 
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understand whether such virtual discursive practices of self-determination bring a novelty to the 
ways in which a rather complex and ambivalent case of self-determination claim is negotiated. 
The paper also tried to find out whether online actions differ from traditional practices and 
performances of self-determination and whether Facebook is an innovative social sphere for the 
politics of self-determination or the cyber claims are in reality formed and negotiated in the same 
manner as the offline ones.  
This study found that Turkish Cypriots’ Facebook activism may very well be for 
strengthening their community, shielding their distinct characteristics from mainland Turkey and 
raising their self-esteem, rather than indicating demands for complete autonomy in the traditional 
political sense of the word and/or statehood. Plus, there is a strong indication that Turkish 
Cypriots are pressurised by their offline identities within their ‘real’ social world in their 
ambivalence for self-determination claims from Turkey and this proves the strong influence and 
impact of offline identities on online ones and claims.  
During the 2009 period, when I observed Turkish Cypriots’ Facebook activisms, radical 
discourses such as extreme self-determination claims and calling people to struggle against 
Turkey and/or derogatory terms about mainland Turks and Turkey in time gradually faded away, 
most probably because of not finding open public support at a large scale. This may be mainly 
because the ‘real’ Turkish Cypriot politico-social space is strongly influenced by familial, 
intercultural, socio-political and socio-economic links with Turkey and mainland Turkey. Strong 
demands for political autonomy and perhaps a possible independent statehood are hence not only 
hindered by social pressure, but also by supranational, national, religious, and ethnic layers being 
parts of the Turkish Cypriot identity. It is very rare hence that online interactions remove people 
from their offline world. They do not most probably create new identities and fresh beginnings, 
either. They may on the contrary be used to support the already existing relationships and help 
keep people in contact, even when life transformations move them away from each other (Ellison 
et al., 2012, p.1165). Social boundaries also affect what people share on social media in northern 
Cyprus. Turkish Cypriots accept invisible offline group norms, identities and bound themselves 
to the norms when they are active in social media (Oze, 2017, p. 623). As such, they might not 
be willing to be too open about their ideological and political affiliations in the social media, not 
to hurt their ‘real’ socio-political environment. These are some of the indications why cyber 
claims may in reality be formed and negotiated in the same manner as the offline ones. 
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 Such indications respond to the initial question asked at the beginning of this article, as 
well: whether the social media possess an enabling power in their own right to generate genuine 
political activism. Although this article’s findings tend to respond unfavourably to this question, 
they also suggest that rather than acting as a passive discursive medium, Facebook’s hosting of 
Turkish Cypriots’ self-determination claims has had an agency on its own and enabled a more 
moderate ground where Turkish Cypriots could express their wish to retain and protect their 
distinct culture and insular identity without creating a hostile environment or antagonising and/or 
excluding their Turkish identity. The shift from more radical Facebook groups on self-
determination claims that operated in 2009 towards the most recent Facebook sites emphasising 
rather the cultural traits and distinctiveness of Cypriots indicates such agency and its ability to 
create a moderate ground. Hence, rather than acting as a new terrain of struggle for self-
determination for politico-economic autonomy and statehood, Facebook, with respect to the 
symbolic and virtual constructions of Cypriotness, may have acted as a mere medium to express 
a “widespread desire” (Stamatopoulou Robbins, 2005) to guard distinctiveness, increase self-
esteem, shield the community characteristics, feed nostalgia, and reconnect with the kin and past.  
Such desire may very well be a form self-determination that depicts more clearly the current 
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